

TCM 75-29

Trends in Communist Propaganda

23 Jul 75

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**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

# Trends in Communist Media

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23 JULY 1975  
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 29)

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FEIS TRENDS  
23 JULY 1975

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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW PROFFESES OPTIMISM REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR U.S. TRADE

Moscow continues to express optimism regarding the prospects for a revision of U.S. trade legislation, just as it has done since its repudiation early this year of the 1974 trade bill. Thus Soviet comment on the recent visit of a U.S. Senate delegation to Moscow has noted growing sentiment in Congress for revising the controversial legislation. In keeping with this outlook, recent Soviet theoretical articles have reiterated the thesis that the growing interdependence of the world's economies requires all countries to eschew economic isolationism and to participate actively in "the international division of labor."

Reports in Soviet media on the remarks made by U.S. senators after their return from a 29 June to 2 July visit to Moscow served to convey an optimistic impression of congressional opinion on trade with the Soviet Union. A TASS dispatch in the 11 July PRAVDA, for example, reported that, influenced by their discussions with Soviet leaders, Senators Scott and Humphrey--co-chairmen of the delegation--and Senator Ribicoff had decided to support efforts to change the discriminatory trade legislation passed last fall. Soviet media did not report that the senators made such revision conditional on Soviet willingness to "loosen up" on emigration and take certain other steps, as reported in the U.S. press. In an article on the internal U.S. discussion of the U.S.-Soviet trade issue, Andrey Tolkunov in the 19 July PRAVDA concluded that a "growing trend toward revision of laws impeding the development of trade and economic relations" is evident on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in the country.

Articles in July issues of KOMMUNIST and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS reiterated Moscow's long-term vision of extensive East-West economic exchange along with a rejection of economic "isolation." While denying that Moscow was in any way compelled to seek such cooperation, the articles nevertheless conceded that the Soviet economy stood to gain substantially. They acknowledged that improvements in the quality and quantity of Soviet manufactured goods for export were vital for a further significant increase in East-West trade.

Economist B. Pichugin's article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS provided an unusual defense of expanded East-West trade. Most efforts to defend a policy of expanded economic contacts with the West, such as the July KOMMUNIST article, have stressed the theme of "cooperation" while avoiding discussion of the continuing competitive

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element. This pattern was established in Brezhnev's own remarks after the April 1973 CPSU plenum which ratified his policy of increased East-West cooperation. Pichugin, on the other hand, argues the compatibility of economic competition and expanded East-West economic links. Noting that economic competition is "one of the chief forms of the class struggle," he asserts that such competition "not only does not impede but on the contrary creates increasingly favorable conditions for the development of economic links." In a discussion reminiscent of the Khrushchev era's sweeping predictions, Pichugin concludes that the socialist countries can catch up and surpass the West in industrial production by the late 1980's.

Pichugin is associated with the Institute of Market Research of the Ministry of Foreign Trade--a ministry that despite its vested interest in expanded trade has a conservative reputation, due in part to apparent resistance to proposed decentralization measures that would facilitate East-West trade but diminish its own role.

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## SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

## PRE-ANNIVERSARY COMMENT UNDERLINES RECURRENT FRICTIONS

Egypt's 23 July revolution anniversary has been heralded again this year by an exchange of Soviet and Egyptian press recriminations underscoring persistent strains in relations. A 15 July PRAVDA article, purportedly a response to Cairo press criticism of Soviet Mideast policies, was transparently directed at President as-Sadat. PRAVDA complained of Cairo journalists' "vicious intent to mislead" Arab audiences through such distortions as the claim that the USSR, to spite Egypt, was denying Cairo weapons it willingly sold to other countries--a charge made by as-Sadat in recent interviews. AL-AKHBAR's editor responded in kind two days later, maintaining that the Cairo press had published no fabrications about the Soviet Union and that PRAVDA's complaints pertained in fact to official Egyptian statements.

Moscow has also intimated some concern over the fate of the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation treaty, noting Arab "rumors" and Egyptian denials that Cairo might renounce the treaty. Other than one recent implicit allusion, Moscow has been silent on as-Sadat's complaints about Soviet recalcitrance on the issue of rescheduling of debts. It has as yet made no mention of the arrival in Moscow of an Egyptian delegation led by the finance minister to discuss the debt problem, although AL-AHRAM has said the visit was at the invitation of the Soviet Government. And of course Moscow, having never acknowledged that it had been granted naval facilities by Egypt, has taken no note of recent Arab and Western news reports that Cairo has been withholding the use of the facilities.

For the past two years Moscow has timed some not-too-veiled criticism of Egyptian policies to closely precede or follow the July anniversary: Last year a major IZVESTIYA article by chief editor Lev Tolkunov rebutted Egyptian complaints regarding Soviet military aid and in turn aired Soviet vexations over aspects of Cairo's foreign and domestic policies. In 1973, Soviet media for three successive days just prior to the revolution anniversary attacked the Cairo weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM for an article claiming the Soviet Union was preparing for a preemptive strike against China to force it to abandon claims to Soviet territory.\*

\* The Tolkunov article is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 July 1974, pages 7-10; treatment of the 1973 anniversary is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 July 1973, pages 15-17.

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Soviet press anniversary articles that year, while on the surface correct, managed to convey undertones of dissatisfaction with Egyptian positions. Moscow thus far has devoted little attention to the anniversary this year, other than an article in the monthly ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY written, as TASS said on 17 July, by "the well-known Soviet Oriental studies expert," Igor Belyayev.

PRAVDA ARTICLE      The major PRAVDA article on 15 July, by P. Nadezhdin, attributed to "certain Cairo journalists" the theme oft expressed by as-Sadat--himself once a journalist--that Egypt must preserve its "free will" by opposing both U.S. and Soviet influence. Calling the writers "blind to realities," Nadezhdin stressed that the USSR had consistently and actively aided Egypt and other Arab countries in the conflict with Israel and in the effort to achieve economic progress.

Recalling the extensive military and economic aid which the USSR had extended to Arab states since 1955, beginning with Egypt, Nadezhdin stressed that disruption of Soviet-Arab relations harms Arab interests. He denounced AL-AKHBAR by name for charging that the USSR now refused to aid Egypt militarily, accusing the newspaper of "vicious" attempts to distort Soviet Mideast policy. Nadezhdin insisted that the USSR "continues to cooperate actively with the Arab countries, including Egypt, in different fields, defense included." In a report on the Nadezhdin PRAVDA article, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress on the 15th added several swipes of its own, noting that "it is clear that the anti-Soviet reactionaries feel more freedom when their attacks are blessed by persons in high places in Cairo." The broadcast professed to be puzzled that Cairo press comment could contradict official statements by the Egyptian leadership, and it selectively cited remarks by as-Sadat to the effect that Egypt believes in friendship and cooperation with the USSR.

AL-AKHBAR's chief editor, Musa Sabri, responded sharply to the Soviet criticism in an article on the 17th entitled "PRAVDA and Cairo's Press." Sabri flatly stated that "PRAVDA's words were primarily directed at official circles in Egypt rather than at the Egyptian press for one simple reason, namely, that the PRAVDA comment was on official Egyptian statements." Characterizing the Cairo press items as "followup and comment" on the official statements, Sabri denied that any falsehoods had been published about the USSR's Mideast policies. He repeated AL-AKHBAR's earlier assertions about Moscow's unwillingness to extend Egypt new military aid and was especially critical of Moscow's dealings with Libya, calling "absurd" the Soviet willingness to supply Libya with new modern weapons while refusing to compensate Egypt for weapons lost in the October 1973 war.

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DIVISIVE ISSUES      Moscow has been largely silent on some of the intertwined issues exacerbating Soviet-Egyptian relations--such as the debt repayment problem and that of possible Egyptian denial of naval facilities--while defensively asserting the correctness of its position on others.

+ Treaty Abrogation: Moscow has taken note of, and dismissed, Arab media speculation that Egypt might renounce the 1971 treaty, which Beirut's AN-NAHAR said on 19 July was viewed by as-Sadat as "absolutely no longer useful." TASS and Moscow radio's Arabic-language service promptly reported an "official denial" in the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF on the 20th that Egypt had never considered abrogation of the treaty, but rather advocated continuation of the treaty and elimination of the present difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Also on the 20th, IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor, N. Polyanov, in Moscow radio's roundtable program, brushed off any possibility of Egypt's abrogation of the treaty as only "some reports concerning the wishes of certain extremist circles," and an example of "how far the calculations of the extremists and militarists in the Middle East go."

+ Sadat on Treaty, Arms: While the AN-NAHAR report on the 19th had said as-Sadat might announce abrogation of the treaty in his 22 July anniversary speech, as-Sadat in fact did not mention the treaty, and referred to the USSR only in passing, in the context of arms supplies. After the October war, he said, "when relations between us and the Soviet Union became strained" and "it did not give us the arms it could," Egypt decided to diversify its arms sources. In interviews in the past, however, as-Sadat has discussed the arms issue in connection with the treaty. Thus, asked by a LE MONDE interviewer in January if he would go so far as to denounce the treaty if he did not receive the requested arms, as-Sadat did not rule out the possibility, but said he would have to "reflect a great deal before taking such a decisive step," although "my patience has limits." In an interview with the Beirut AL-HAWADITH last March he in effect accused the Soviet Union of violating the treaty--presumably with Article 8 on military cooperation in mind--when he said the USSR had accused him of wanting to expel it from the area, but had he wanted to do so "I would have abrogated our treaty, particularly since an actual legal violation had taken place regarding some of its positions."

+ PRAVDA on Treaty: Moscow has ignored as-Sadat's implication that by failing to provide arms it was violating a treaty provision. But the Nadezhdin article in PRAVDA on the 15th seemed to obliquely challenge as-Sadat on this point. It cited as-Sadat's own words

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on friendship with the "Soviet people"--in a message to the Soviet leaders on the occasion of the treaty anniversary--as an "admission" not only of the USSR's firm support for the Arab and Egyptian struggle, but also of the fact that the Soviet Union "abides by the letter and spirit of the treaty."

+ Naval Facilities: Moscow has taken no note of Arab press speculation that Egypt might close its naval facilities to Soviet warships. Beirut's AL-HAYAH reported on the 19th, in an article datelined from the Egyptian port city of Alexandria, that Egypt had decided not to allow such Soviet use "as of the beginning of next month." AL-HAYAH cited the view of political observers in Alexandria that the move was a warning to Moscow that it must change its policy on not compensating Egypt for weapons lost during the October 1973 war, and that the issue of Soviet use of Cairo's port facilities could even be viewed as "a prelude to another step" toward applying pressure on Moscow--abrogation of the treaty. AL-HAYAH also asserted that the USSR had sought naval harbors in Libya to compensate for the possible loss of port facilities in Egypt.

Moscow has demonstrated sensitivity to Cairo press charges that it has sought or obtained military bases in Libya. Soviet vexation was reflected in Nedezhdin's PRAVDA article, which denounced AL-AKHBAR for "fabrications" that Moscow had sought bases in Libya, which had agreed to "Soviet occupation" through military bases and weapons. Along similar lines, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress on the 17th criticized AL-AHRAM for recent articles about Soviet bases, charging that the writers were "local reactionary forces" being used for political sabotage by "agents of colonialism and Zionism" who seek to separate the Arab states from the USSR, "their natural ally."

+ Sidqi on Aid: Reflecting Soviet defensiveness as well as irritation over Egyptian complaints about Soviet inadequacies in military and technical aid, Moscow has given extensive and unusual publicity to an interview by former Egyptian prime minister 'Aziz Sidqi in the July issue of the Egyptian journal AT-TALI'AH. First reporting the interview in a 5 July Arabic-language broadcast, Moscow then publicized it in various foreign-language broadcasts 11 through 14 July, and on the 17th began broadcasting daily installments of the interview in its Arabic-language service. A PRAVDA report on 9 July cited Sidqi as praising Soviet economic and technical aid to Egypt and referring also to the "strengthening of Egypt's defense capability and the equipping of its armed forces with modern military equipment." Sidqi was also reported as having cited various industrial projects built with Soviet aid, such as the Aswan Dam; Moscow has displayed particular touchiness

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to Egyptian criticism of what Nadezhdin in his PRAVDA article called "inventions" about "the 'negative' consequences" of the Aswan project.

+ Moscow Talks on Debt Payment, Arms: Soviet media have thus far been silent on the current visit to Moscow of an Egyptian delegation led by Finance Minister Isma'il. AL-AHRAM reported on the 20th that the delegation would include "representatives of the ministries of war, finance, industry, foreign affairs, trade, and the central bank" and that the trip was at Soviet invitation. In remarks on departure on the 22d, as reported by Cairo radio, Isma'il focused on the debt issue, saying his mission was to look into the possibility of the Soviet Union postponing repayment of "part" of the debt stemming from trade transactions, "the arms we have received," and technical cooperation on several projects. AL-AHRAM on the 18th had linked the issues of arms supplies and debt payments, reporting that Egypt might decide not to settle its debts with Moscow "worth millions of dollars" if it concluded that Moscow had refrained from delivering spare parts and ammunition.

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## PORTUGAL

## USSR ASSAILS SOCIALISTS FOR OPPOSING REVOLUTION, SUPPORTS MFA

Moscow has continued to express support for Portugal's ruling Armed Forces Movement (MFA) during a week in which the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) followed its Socialist Party (PS) allies in withdrawing from the government, the Revolution Council announced that a new, nonparty government would be formed, and the Socialists held massive weekend demonstrations in Oporto and Lisbon and called for the resignation of Prime Minister Goncalves. Moscow has implied support for the embattled prime minister by citing the approval of the "working class" for efforts to rebuff demands for his resignation. The Socialists, now a target of steady Moscow criticism, were attacked in particularly strong tones in a 16 July IZVESTIYA article which additionally made an unusual pledge that "Portugal can count on active economic and political cooperation with the socialist countries." Moscow has also condemned the Socialists' active role in the Constituent Assembly, accusing "subversive" elements of trying to bypass the pre-election pact between the MFA and the political parties--an agreement which severely limited the parties' activities--and of trying to turn the assembly into a "bourgeois parliament" with "unauthorized functions and powers."

CRITICISM OF SOCIALISTS In what was probably Moscow's harshest attack to date on the Socialist Party, an L. Kamynin article in 16 July IZVESTIYA blamed the PS for the "aggravated" situation in Portugal, which he viewed as a "deeper demarcation of political forces" resulting from the increasing class struggle. As earlier comment had done, Kamynin rejected the Socialists' "fabricated 'pretexts'" for opposition to the government--such as the government's takeover of the PS paper REPUBLICA--and concluded that the real reason was "the Socialist Party leadership's slide into the position of the reactionary forces and defenders of the oligarchy." Kamynin accused the PS of "acting in union with the opponents of revolutionary change" but predicted "an unenviable fate" for those opposed to the revolution, because the people remained committed to the MFA, and Portugal could "count on active economic and political cooperation with the socialist countries."

A similar warning to the Socialists had been sounded in a 15 July IZVESTIYA article on Portugal's Constituent Assembly, a PS-led body elected last April. Noting that the assembly had been created "with the single and exclusive aim" of drafting a constitution, IZVESTIYA correspondent Ardatovskiy charged that there had been

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"subversive activity," such as attempts to increase the assembly's functions and "in a certain way place it above the Revolutionary Council and the government." Ardatovskiy cited the Revolutionary Council as protesting that the assembly "must in no way interfere in the political life" of the country. And he concluded with a sharp reminder that any constitution must be approved by the government and thus, "attempts to impose a constitution contradicting the alliance of the people and the MFA" are "doomed to failure." In a similar vein, a SOVIET RUSSIA article by Anatoliy Karasikov, as reported by TASS on the 18th, observed that the Socialists "became so conceited" after their electoral victory that they were "deliberately disregarding" the pre-election pact and were trying to "drive a wedge" into the MFA. Karasikov said that the Socialist Party was ignoring the fact that their electoral success was due to their "promise to consolidate the alliance of the people and the armed forces," an alliance which they were now damaging.

GONCALVES AND MFA Moscow, which has consistently backed the MFA since the earliest days of the revolution, continues to give verbal support to the Movement and thus, indirectly, to its leftist prime minister, Vasco Goncalves. TASS on 23 July cited the Portuguese paper O SECULO as reporting that "the Armed Forces Movement fully supports the prime minister" and that "the toiling masses warmly approve" of the MFA's "resolute rebuffs" to PS leader Soares' calls for Goncalves' resignation. In straightforward reportage on the efforts to form a new government, Moscow seems to have gone along with the MFA's notion of a "nonparty coalition" in which civilians would participate, but not as party representatives. PRAVDA on 18 July quoted Portuguese newspapers as "predicting the formation of a new 'nonparty' council of ministers," and TASS on the 20th reported the Revolutionary Council communique of the 19th as saying that the PS and PPD withdrawals "made it necessary to create a new government that will have the character of a 'nonparty coalition.'"

Perhaps with an eye to the need for a speedy solution to the crisis before the situation further deteriorates, TASS on the 18th reported the Portuguese Communist party paper AVANTE as "warning that the instigating actions of Socialist leaders" could create "favorable conditions for unification of rightwing forces and rally all enemies of the Portuguese revolution."

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## USSR - JAPAN

## MOSCOW STEPS UP CRITICISM OF TOKYO ON "ANTIHEGEMONY" ISSUE

Moscow media have continued to comment on Chinese efforts to insert an antihegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship. However, after earlier pointing up Japanese opposition to such a clause, Moscow inexplicably has now begun to stress Japanese officials' willingness to include such a clause in the treaty. The current Soviet comment does not seem to be responding to any recent public statements by Japanese leaders, citing instead remarks which seem to be those made by Prime Minister Miki over a month ago, though not identified as such.

A 12 July SOVIET RUSSIA article reported by TASS the same day accused "some high-ranking Japanese leaders" of attempting to "gloss over" the "anti-Soviet" character of the "antihegemony" provision and of presenting it as a "generally recognized principle of peace," a phrase nearly identical to one used by Miki in Diet interpellations on 18 June. Less directly, a 15 July IZVESTIYA article by V. Kudryavtsev noted that "extremely authoritative Japanese political circles" have "increasingly candidly been seeking justification for Peking's scheme" by attempting to persuade the Japanese public that the hegemony clause was not directed against the Soviet Union and that Sino-Japanese relations were being built up "irrespective" of relations with the USSR. The IZVESTIYA commentary found such conduct "amazing" and warned the "highly placed Japanese" that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent" to Peking's attempts to draw Japan into the anti-Soviet orbit.

This comment is at variance with that following a 12 June Soviet statement warning Japan on the antihegemony clause.\* At that time, Moscow had optimistically portrayed Japanese resistance to Chinese "pressure" and favorably reported the Japanese government's reply to the Soviet statement. For example, a 1 July IZVESTIYA article by V. Kassis had suggested that "although some Tokyo politicians . . . endeavor to prove that the thesis on the struggle against 'hegemonism' is not directed against any 'specific third country'," recently "Japanese leading figures" have advocated strengthening Japanese-Soviet relations, an idea which, according to IZVESTIYA, was reflected in the Japanese government's reply to the 12 June statement. Moreover, PRAVDA, in a 4 July article by

\* This statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 June 1975, page 11, and of 9 July 1975, page 5.

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its Tokyo correspondent I. Latyshev, had commented that the "comparatively small group" in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party supporting an "anti-Soviet compact" with Peking had found no support from the party's "influential leaders." While noting that Miki had expressed readiness to sign a treaty with the Chinese, PRAVDA also quoted him as calling on Peking to "renounce its intention of turning it into an alliance aimed unambiguously against a 'third country'."

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## FOREIGN MINISTER URGES STRONGER NONALIGNED SUPPORT TO DETENTE

Expounding Belgrade's platform for the 25-29 August meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers in Lima, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mircic, in an 18 July parliamentary speech, expressed hope that the nonaligned countries would come out more strongly for detente. Mircic pointedly noted that "some" nonaligned members had expressed "reservations" about detente, believing that it applied only to Europe. Implicitly rejecting this position, he called for a return to the "original foundations" of nonalignment, which he described as the source of detente, and for an "even clearer definition" of the term to emphasize the "significant active" role of the nonaligned countries.

The relatively moderate tone of Mircic's speech was underscored by his mild response to Secretary Kissinger's Milwaukee speech a few days earlier in which the Secretary had criticized the Third World countries for confrontation policies in the UN General Assembly. Although the Belgrade media had sharply criticized Kissinger's remarks, Mircic avoided a direct reference to Kissinger, confining himself to a denial of "unfounded accusations . . . that nonaligned countries are creating obstacles to the settling of acute international problems."

A somewhat similar moderate attitude had been reflected in Belgrade's treatment of the 17-19 March meeting of the nonaligned Coordinating Bureau in Havana. The final declaration, carried in the 24 March Havana GRANMA, had repeatedly attacked the United States on a broad range of issues. Commenting on the declaration in a 20 March TANJUG interview, Mircic avoided either endorsing or criticizing the document. He did, however, note that it contained "sharp expressions" and that there were some "differences in the participants' opinions about certain matters." In addition, Belgrade media selectively omitted or toned down the anti-U.S. statements contained in the declaration and in various delegates' speeches. This moderate treatment was likely influenced by the fact that Premier Bijedic was visiting the United States on 18-21 March.

Although Mircic expressed satisfaction that "several countries" had applied for membership within the nonaligned group, he appeared to indicate that new members should be screened carefully. He asserted in this connection that "consistent respect for" and "adherence to" the principles of nonalignment should be among the criteria used in assessing applications.

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## VIETNAM

## DRV, PRG APPLY FOR UN MEMBERSHIP, DISPATCH OBSERVER TEAMS

Hanoi radio has belatedly announced that the PRG and the DRV have formally applied for admission to the United Nations. According to a 23 July Hanoi broadcast, the PRG sent its application to the UN Secretary General on 15 July and the DRV followed suit the next day. The same brief report also noted that UN observer teams representing the PRG and DRV left for New York on the 23d. While the issue of DRV and PRG membership in the United Nations is not known to have been discussed in Vietnamese communist media, Hanoi's attitude toward the international body--as reflected in comment on issues before the United Nations--has evolved from one of open hostility in the 1960's to recent speculation on UN potential for "foiling" U.S. "schemes."

Hanoi in effect prepared the ground for its public announcement of the initiative to the United Nations in commentary in the party paper NHAN DAN on 17 July. The commentary, responding to Secretary Kissinger's 15 July press conference remarks on the United Nations, was unusually positive in its assessment of the international body. Taking issue with what it claimed were "rude allegations" by Kissinger with regard to the U.S. role in the United Nations vis-a-vis the smaller countries, NHAN DAN seemed to imply that the United Nations was now an effective political force. The commentary maintained that "the situation in the United Nations began to change in the early 1960's" when several Third World countries were admitted. It boasted that these countries, along with the socialist countries, "form the majority bloc in the UN General Assembly, which has foiled numerous schemes of the U.S. imperialists...over the past few years."

Hanoi's previous negative assessment of the United Nations had been reflected, for example, in a NHAN DAN commentary in July 1967 on a UN General Assembly emergency session on the Middle East. That commentary portrayed the United Nations as an impotent organization "under U.S. sway" and bitterly complained that in the past 20 years it had "not only failed to fulfill its mission but has also many times been turned into an instrument to shield aggressive acts or carry out aggressive schemes of the United States and its henchmen." During both the 1971 UN debate on China's representation and the effort late last year to oust the Lon Nol representation in favor of Sihanouk's Cambodian regime, Hanoi steered a neutral course in its public statements on the effectiveness of the United Nations, contenting itself with charges of U.S. "trickery" and "pressure" to exclude the PRG and RGNUC.

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## NORTH VIETNAM'S NAM HA PROVINCE CONVENES PARTY CONGRESS

One of North Vietnam's major provinces, densely populated, rice-producing Nam Ha Province, convened its third "congress of delegates of provincial party organizations" from 23 to 30 June, according to Hanoi radio reports. As was the case for other provincial and municipal congresses in the past year, the Nam Ha congress agenda offers no hint that any decision has been reached on convening the long-delayed fourth national VWP congress--the first since 1960. Hanoi media reports on the Nam Ha provincial congress noted that the delegates reviewed the activities of the province since 1972--when its second congress was held, set forth future tasks, elected a new executive committee, and heard VWP Central Committee Secretary Hoang Anh speak on Nam Ha's contribution to the Vietnamese victory and the delegate's "duties and responsibilities" for the coming years.

The presence of Hoang Anh at Nam Ha's party congress conforms to a practice that has apparently been in effect for more than a year now--assigning the lesser lights of Hanoi's central party leadership to attend even the more important provincial congresses. For example, a 5 June Hanoi radio account of a party congress held in Nam Ha's neighboring province of Thanh Hoa noted the presence of Xuan Thuy, who--like Hoang Anh--is also a secretary of the VWP Central Committee. Likewise, municipal party congresses held in 1974 in Hanoi and Haiphong were attended by another Central Committee secretary, Nguyen Van Tran.\*

Nam Ha's two previous provincial party congresses were attended by much higher-level representatives of the national party leadership. The first Nam Ha party congress in June 1960 heard VWP First Secretary Le Duan deliver a major address on DRV domestic policies, and the province's second congress in early 1972 was attended by Hanoi's second-ranking party leader, Truong Chinh, who used the forum to expound the party's current economic line.

NATIONAL CONGRESS  
DATE UNMENTIONED

Neither Hanoi's reports on the Nam Ha congress nor its accounts of earlier regional party congresses have made any mention of the anticipated fourth national VWP congress. Since regional congresses are required to discuss draft proposals to be presented to the national congress and to elect delegates to the national conclave, the continued silence about the fourth congress suggests that Hanoi's leaders still have not set a date for it.

\* The Hanoi congress is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 14-16.

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Although the North Vietnamese party's statutes specify that congresses should be held every four years, it has been almost 15 years since the third national VWP congress was held in September 1960. Preparations for the 1960 congress had been duly reflected in North Vietnamese media for almost a year, following the final decision to convene the meeting at a VWP Central Committee plenum in October 1959.

The realization of the long-sought goal of a unified Vietnam under communist control and the need to refashion objectives to conform with peacetime conditions would seem to call for new, long-range policy decisions that would be appropriately formulated at a national party congress. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung may have been indirectly alluding to the need for a new congress when they observed in their recent lengthy article on the communist victory in South Vietnam that an analysis of the southern situation prior to the final offensive had led the party to conclude that "our people were facing a historic opportunity to . . . fulfill the tasks set forth by the party's third congress."\*

\* See the TRENDS of 16 July 1975, pages 15-17 for a discussion of the Giap-Dung article.

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## U S S R

## LEADERSHIP CHANGES NOTED IN ARMENIA, KAZAKHSTAN, LATVIA

The publication of new republic cabinet lists following the June republic Supreme Soviet elections makes it clear that few republics have made extensive changes in leadership. Shakeups have occurred in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Latvia, though mainly at the secondary level and not affecting members of the CPSU Central Committee. Changes in Armenia--replacing the Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, two deputy premiers and several ministers--are a continuation of the purge following the November 1974 ouster of First Secretary Kochinyan. The replacing of three Central Committee secretaries and a first deputy premier in Kazakhstan appears to have been brought about by industrial and agricultural shortcomings.\* Latvia's changes are mainly transfers, but at least one of the officials--ideology secretary A.A. Drizul--has been clearly demoted. In addition, a new first deputy premier has just been appointed in the RSFSR, and in recent months new second secretaries were named in Georgia, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenia, but no further shakeups have occurred in these republics.\*\*

**ARMENIA** Armenia continued its leadership changes at the 4 July republic Supreme Soviet session, electing a new Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman and dropping both deputy premiers in charge of industry. Longtime Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman N. Kh. Arutyunyan retired on pension and was replaced by B. Ye. Sarkisov, chairman of the state committee on prices. Deputy premiers L.A. Stepanyan and G.T. Arutyunyan were dropped, with the latter becoming chairman of the state committee on prices. Longtime Armenian Central Committee industry section head K.A. Gambaryan and Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary R. Kh. Svetlova (formerly head of the Armenian Central Committee light and food industries section) became deputy premiers. Premier G.A. Arzumanyan, First Deputy Premier G.A. Martirosyan, and deputy premiers for agriculture G.S. Petrosyan and A.M. Kirakosyan were renamed. A new minister of finance was named: the former minister became minister of trade, and the trade minister became head of the state committee for use of labor resources.

\* For background on the Kazakhstan changes, see the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 26-27.

\*\* For details on the changes in the three Central Asian republics, see the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 27-28.

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Since the ouster of republic First Secretary Kochinyan last November, a long series of changes has occurred. In December Ye. G. Patalov became minister of internal affairs; in January republic trade union council chairman G.V. Tardzhumanyan became agriculture minister, and G.M. Voskanyan, head of the Armenian Central Committee party organizational work section, was elected Central Committee secretary; in March Yerevan mayor G.O. Asratyan was fired in connection with corruption in housing allocation; and in May Yerevan First Secretary L.P. Garibzhanyan was transferred to the post of Armenian minister of higher and secondary specialized education, Yerevan Second Secretary L.G. Saakyan became republic trade union chief, an All-Union Komsomol Central Committee official was sent down from Moscow to become republic Komsomol first secretary, and all three secretaries of the republic writers union were replaced.

**KAZAKHSTAN** Outside of Armenia, the most extensive leadership changes have occurred in Kazakhstan, where four of the 11 bureau members have been replaced with new men in the last three months. The latest Kazakh change came at a mid-July republic Central Committee plenum which removed Central Committee Secretary V.K. Sevryukov (longtime supervisor of cadres as head of the republic Central Committee's party organizational work section from 1961 to 1971) and replaced him with A.I. Klimov, former head of the Kazakh Central Committee light and food industries section, and since April 1973 deputy chairman of the republic Gosplan. In April republic secretary for industry A.S. Koleyayev, secretary for agriculture M.B. Iksanov and first deputy premier for industry A.M. Vartanyan were removed, coincident with First Secretary Kunayev's denunciation of serious errors in industrial and agricultural construction at a late April plenum. They were replaced by republic Minister for Construction of Heavy Industrial Enterprises A.G. Korkin, Ural Obkom First Secretary Sh.K. Kospanov, and Tselinny mining and chemical combine director S.A. Smirnov, respectively.

**LATVIA** Latvia has undergone extensive shifts during the past year, although the top level officials, the first secretary, second secretary and premier, have been unaffected, thus suggesting that the changes have been aimed at consolidating the local leadership. The most recent changes began at a late May republic Central Committee plenum, which removed ideology secretary A.A. Drizul and replaced him with Minister for Higher and Secondary Specialized Education I.A. Anderson. Drizul was clearly being demoted, since the list of newly-elected Latvian Supreme Soviet deputies published in mid-June identified him only as vice president of the republic Academy of Sciences. A 3 July republic Central Committee plenum replaced secretary for industry E.K. Peterson with Riga First Secretary E. Ya. Aushkap. On 4 July republic Central Committee party organizational work section head B.K. Pugo was elected Riga first secretary.

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The new government announced on 5 July added Peterson as deputy premier, replacing I.A. Gaylis. The premier, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the first deputy premier, as well as three of the four deputy premiers, were renamed at the July republic Supreme Soviet session; however, some of these officials are relatively new also, having been named in a round of changes only last August. At that time, First Deputy Premier P. Strautmanis became Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, replacing V.P. Ruben, who was transferred to the purely ceremonial post of chairman of the USSR Council of Nationalities in Moscow. Strautmanis was succeeded as first deputy premier by republic agriculture secretary K.O. Verro. V.A. Chemm, head of a sector in the CPSU Central Committee agriculture section and onetime head of the Latvian Central Committee agriculture section, thereupon returned to Latvia to become republic secretary for agriculture.

RSFSR There has been only one recent change in the RSFSR leadership, but that was a high-level change, affecting CPSU Central Committee member V.I. Vorotnikov. On 10 July Voronezh Obkom First Secretary Vorotnikov was appointed RSFSR first deputy premier, succeeding A.M. Shkolnikov, who had been transferred to head of the USSR Peoples Control Committee last year. The other first deputy premier, N.F. Vasilyev, supervises agriculture. All deputy premiers and ministers were renamed at the 15 July RSFSR Supreme Soviet session.

Vorotnikov was replaced in Voronezh by Leningrad Obkom Second Secretary V.N. Ignatov. Ignatov had been head of the Leningrad obkom's agriculture section and then obkom secretary for agriculture before becoming second secretary in January 1973.

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## CHINA

## PEKING STRESSES NEED TO ENLARGE WORKER UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

Unusually heavy Chinese media attention to this year's anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's 21 July 1968 directive, which called for emulation of the workers university established by the Shanghai machine tools plant, appears to indicate the emergence of a double-track system of higher education that insulates workers from regular students. Peking's apparent decision to expand post-middle school educational facilities may be in response to dissatisfaction among young people who desire at least some form of further training, and will also serve to improve technical expertise among factory workers.

Claiming that "a boom in the development of factory-run workers colleges" is underway, NCNA on 20 July praised several localities for solving problems in running workers colleges so that more factory-run schools "can come into being and become better and better in quality" and for graduating worker students skilled in using both "the pen and the hammer." Regular institutes of higher learning function outside of the worker college system, and NCNA reported that such regular institutions have supported the factory-run workers colleges and that teachers and students from regular institutes have gone into factories "to help solve problems regarding faculties and teaching materials." Similarly, Nanking radio on 21 July lauded some local schools of higher learning for sending "experienced teachers and cadres" to factories "to help run their schools well."

Perhaps in response to student dissatisfaction, several provinces have recently noted that the Chaoyang educational model--in which graduates return to their original units as ordinary workers--will be fully applied only in agricultural schools. Graduates in all other fields of study will be assigned to areas where their classroom skills are most needed, thus encouraging qualified students to undertake training in technically demanding fields.

Neither the provincial nor the central media have indicated any unusual concern over the possibility that the double-tracked higher education system and the new system of job allocation will foster intellectual elitism, which is still strictly proscribed.

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## NOTES

MOSCOW ON APOLLO-SOYUZ FLIGHT: Moscow's extremely heavy publicity for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project flight, which commenced with the launching of Soyuz-19 on 15 July, included unprecedented live coverage of the launching and recovery and candid reporting of the minor difficulties as well as the achievements of the joint flight. Soviet comment dwelt on the flight's significance for future cooperative space ventures and for U.S.-Soviet relations generally. Taking a cue from Brezhnev's greetings to the Soyuz and Apollo crews on 17 July, commentators emphasized that such a cooperative effort in an area of former competition was made possible only by the recent marked improvement in bilateral relations. According to one radio commentary, cooperation in the "supersecret sphere of space research" would have been unthinkable in the cold war atmosphere which prevailed not long ago. Technical director Konstantin Bushuyev and other Soviet participants in the project told Soviet interviewers that the joint work during and in preparation for the flight had shown that specialists of the two countries could work together successfully on such a complex technical problem despite "natural" disagreements that arose. Brezhnev's message said that "Soyuz-Apollo is a prototype of future international orbital stations." TASS reported shift flight controller Viktor Blagov as telling reporters on the 19th that one form of future cooperation might involve "the future American spaceship shuttle and the Soviet orbital station Salyut."

MOSCOW ON ANGOLA: Sporadic fighting between rival liberation groups in Angola has prompted routine Soviet comment reaffirming Moscow's long-standing support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and accusing the Chinese of backing the MPLA's opposition. Moscow has blamed the breakdown of the recent cease-fire--negotiated by leaders of Angola's three liberation movements during a 16-22 June meeting in Kenya--on the MPLA's chief rival, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). Characterizing the Moscow-oriented MPLA as a "tested vanguard" of the Angolan people and the "most representative Angolan organization," a 16 July TASS report from Brazzaville denounced the FNLA as a "reactionary" organization formed with the assistance of the United States and "multinational corporations" that was being armed and trained by the Chinese for the purpose of "physically eliminating" the MPLA. A 17 July TASS article by political commentator Kulik expanded on the theme of Chinese support for the FNLA. TASS cited Western and African newspaper reports that the Chinese had trained FNLA troops and supplied them with weapons, and went on to condemn the Chinese for "teaming up

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with agents of U.S. imperialism" to assist "those forces that have no support of the people." Kulik's anti-Chinese polemics and charges of Sino-American collusion in Angolan affairs do not represent a new tack in Soviet propaganda: similar arguments have appeared periodically since the collapse of the Portuguese colonial system in Africa more than a year ago, particularly during periods of tension and fighting between the MPLA and rival groups.

MOSCOW ON MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: Moscow and its East European allies have continued to mark time on the sixth round of the Vienna force reduction talks, which recessed until 22 September after sessions from 15 May to 17 July. Media comment reiterated previously established positions and provided a bare minimum of publicity on the conclusion of the sixth round, TASS observing on the 17th that "no practical results" had yet been achieved. This position was reinforced by other Moscow comment noting "fundamental" differences that persist between the two sides' proposals. Other standard claims reiterated that the NATO proposals were one-sided and would give "unilateral" advantage to NATO, in contrast to the Warsaw Pact states' various "meaningful" and "compromise" proposals which, it is said, now require new "realistic" Western proposals to move the talks out of their impasse. Recent comment has, as in the past, avoided being totally negative by citing the "good atmosphere" at the talks and pointing to some specific areas where progress might be achieved. TASS on the 17th pointed to one such area as the Pact "initiative" to work out a "coordinated definition of what troops should be called ground troops" and "which should be called air forces." Poland's Vienna spokesman T. Strulak, in his press conference on the 17th reported by Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU the next day, feebly linked the force reduction talks to the upcoming Helsinki European conference summit by observing that the summit would "also have a bearing on the Vienna negotiations" and adding that the need for specific measures in the military area of detente "is no doubt acquiring increasing urgency."

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PHNOM PENH RADIO ON SIHANOUK: While no government has yet surfaced in Cambodia and the ultimate role of Sihanouk has not been made clear, Phnom Penh radio during the past month has resumed periodic references to him as "chief of state" and chairman of the Cambodian Front (NUFC). Sihanouk, who had been confirmed in his offices at the "special national congress" at the end of April, inexplicably was not mentioned by Phnom Penh radio from mid-May until 21 June, although there were messages in his name during that period which could have been reported. Most of the recent references to Sihanouk, including the one on 21 June, have been in news reports on Cambodian envoys abroad extending messages of gratitude from Sihanouk to the leaders of states they visited. He was also mentioned in a Phnom Penh radio commentary on Cambodian unity on 2 July, however. And on 20 July the radio for the first time cited a recent action by the prince when it noted that he had sent a message of sympathy to Romanian President Ceausescu over damage from recent floods. The message was sent from North Korea, where Sihanouk has been visiting since 19 May, and was first publicized by DPRK media on 15 July. Phnom Penh radio has still not taken note of Sihanouk's sojourn in Korea.

PRC SUMMER HARVEST: A 22 July NCNA report claimed that China has reaped a "good" summer harvest this year, with both total grain output and per hectare yield topping previous records. The report stated that 19 of China's 24 provinces producing summer grain registered increases over last year and that "all" areas of North China showed gains. The North China increases this year may in part reflect a rise over last year's disappointing yields there, which were, however, compensated for by last year's excellent summer rice yields in South China, which NCNA reported were up by 20 percent. NCNA named 11 areas, mostly in North China, where this year's increase exceeded 10 percent. Previously this year a dozen provinces had reported summer harvest yields, with most claiming increases over 1974 of 10 to 20 percent, though an NCNA report on Yunnan on 28 April claimed a 30 percent increment. The summer crops account for less than half of China's total grain output, and the NCNA report noted that rural workers, "encouraged by the excellent summer harvest," are intensifying field management of autumn crops.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14 - 20 JULY 1975

<u>Moscow (2496 items)</u>			<u>Peking (881 items)</u>		
Soyuz-Apollo Space Mission	(6%)	33%	Sao Tome Independence	(1%)	9%
China	(6%)	6%	[Chou En-lai	(1%)	3%]
Brezhnev Greetings to Moscow	(--)	3%	Greetings		
Symposium on Scientists'			[Joint Communique (--)	3%]	
Role in Disarmament			on Establishment		
Supreme Soviet Session	(6%)	3%	of Diplomatic		
Sao Tome Independence	(2%)	2%	Relations		
			European Security	(1%)	7%
			Conference		
			Middle East	(2%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.